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Abstract 
Power relations affect dynamics within groups. Power-holders  not only 
determine their personal outcomes, but also the outcomes of others in the group that they 
control. Yet, power-holders often tend to overlook this responsibility to take care of collective 
interests. The present research investigated how social identification with the group to 
which both the powerful and the powerless belong alters perceived responsibility among 
power-holders (and the powerless). Combining research on social power and social identity, 
we argue that power-holders perceive more responsibility than the powerless when strongly 
(rather than when weakly) identifying with the group. A study among leaders and an 
experiment supported this, highlighting that although power-holders are often primarily 
concerned about personal outcomes, they do feel responsible for considering others
when these others are included in the (social) self.  
(132 words) 
 
Keywords: social identity, social identification, social power, responsibility, construal of 
power 
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Highly identified power-holders feel responsible:  
The interplay between social identification and social power within groups  
Power-holders in governments and organizations frequently make decisions with far-
reaching consequences that not only affect their personal welfare, but have broader 
implications. This is the case, for instance, when deciding about large-scale investments or 
organizational restructurings. Situations like these call for power-holders who do not only 
consider their personal interests (e.g., achieving individual benefits), but also take the interests 
of the collective to be affected by their decisions into account be it society, their 
organization, or their team. In short, these decisions require power-holders to perceive 
responsibility for taking care of broader (group-level) goals, such as collective concerns and 
outcomes.  
Power-holders perceiving responsibility tend to make fairer, more informed decisions 
(e.g., they better consider 
2017), which can motivate those low in power and boost collective success (see, e.g., Chen, 
Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; De Hoogh & den Hartog, 2008; Maner & Mead, 2010). Yet, 
power-holders are, in fact, often tempted to overlook their responsibility (e.g., Chen et al., 
2001; Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012; Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2013). 
Elevated power rather seems to evoke a focus on personal benefits or desires (Lammers, 
Galinsky, Dubois, & Rucker, 2015) and hinders power-holders from perceiving responsibility 
to tend to collective concerns and other welfare.  
As the positive implications of power- perceived responsibility for subsequent 
behavior are already well-established, the challenge now lies in identifying situational 
preconditions that stimulate power-holders to better recognize their responsibility. 
Considering power in collective contexts, social identification should play a key role in 
shaping the responsibility that power-holders perceive. Power-holders and the powerless often 
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belong to one-and-the same social group, such as a society, an organization, or a team, in 
which they have different hierarchical positions. In these contexts, the degree to which power-
holders identify with the joint group instead of conceiving of their personal concerns and 
outcomes as being detached from those of others may impact their perceived responsibility 
to take care of this group and its members.  
To investigate this possibility, the present research brings together research on social 
power (Guinote, 2007a; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) and social identity (Brewer, 
1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Prior 
research connecting these two lines has, so far, focused only on the powerless. This work 
demonstrated, for instance, 
renders them more likely to support and follow a power-holder (especially when this power-
holder seems to embody and advance joint group goals; see Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 
2011). Complementing this prior work, the current research focuses on how social 
identification of the powerful impacts their responsibility for the achievement of group-goals.  
We propose that a power-holder should perceive more responsibility than a low-power 
person if s/he strongly (compared to weakly) identifies with the joint group because strong 
social identification implies that the group and its members are considered as being part of the 
(social) self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). The present research studied this 
interplay between social identification and social power. In doing so, we sought to 
demonstrate that power-holders who often focus primarily on personal benefits may 
perceive more responsibility when their self is dominated by the social identity they share 
with those low in power.  
When and how social power promotes responsibility  
Social power implies asymmetric 
affording access to important resources (e.g., rewards, money, social appreciation; Fiske & 
Berdahl, 2007). Elevated power provides relative independence from others, whereas having 
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low power  situation and outcomes strongly depend on the power-holder. 
High power can be understood as implying opportunities that is, greater freedom to make 
decisions and pursue goals and/or as implying responsibilities that is, a privilege and 
inner obligation to make decisions and take care of things that others cannot take care of (e.g., 
the achievement of collective goals or  welfare; Chen et al., 2001; Fiske & Berdahl, 
2007; Sassenberg et al., 2012; Scheepers et al., 2013; Zhong et al., 2006). Power-holders are 
usually well aware of their opportunities, whereas they often tend to neglect their 
responsibility (see Sassenberg et al., 2014).  
Resulting from the relative independence a power-position affords, being powerful 
activates approach tendencies and a focus on rewards, while being powerless promotes 
inhibition tendencies and a focus on threats and punishments (Keltner et al., 2003). A similar 
argument has been put forth by the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a): 
because power-holders are more independent from others, they should be better at focusing on 
what is relevant in a given situation that is, on accessible constructs, usually being their 
personal goal or agenda. Conversely, the powerless depending on others are more distracted 
by concerns about external factors (e.g., how others evaluate them; Guinote, 2007b, 2007c, 
2008; Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014, 2015). Accordingly, this perspective argues that power-
holders better adapt to accessible goals (for evidence see Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012) with 
these goals usually being personal.  
Indeed, compared to those low in power, power-holders frequently behave more in 
line with their personal agenda (Lammers et al., 2015): they are more inspired by their own 
contributions (van Kleef, Oveis, Homan, van der Löwe, & Keltner, 2015), respond more to 
personal needs (Guinote, 2010), and more authentically and directly express their feelings, 
traits, and opinions (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Kraus, Chen, 
& Keltner, 2011). At the same time, power-holders (Kipnis, 
1972), are show less neurological 
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responses s (Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014), and tend to dehumanize 
others (Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013; Lammers & Stapel, 2011). In short, power-holders are 
often concerned about personal interests, neglecting their responsibility for broader (group-
level) goals.  
At times, however, power-holders do seem to be aware of their responsibility. Power-
holders (compared to the powerless) show stronger signs of responsibility when they 
generally care about others (Chen et al., 2001; Côté et al., 2011; DeCelles, de Rue, Margolis, 
& Ceranic, 2012; Gordon & Chen, 2013), are directed towards specific others (Galinsky, 
Magee, Rus, Rothman, & Todd, 2014; Overbeck & Park, 2006), or come from a cultural 
background emphasizing 06). This 
suggests that power-holders perceive responsibility especially when other people are relevant 
for their personal goals or agenda.  
Going beyond such (mostly) stable preconditions, we assume that the social situation, 
more specifically, the group context, can make others relevant to the power-holder. First 
evidence stems from Karremans and Smith (2010), who showed that when a specific other 
person is personally close to a power-holder and, thus, likely included in the power-  
self (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) the power-holder behaves more responsibly towards 
this close other (i.e., more forgiving). Accordingly, people seem to be able to include specific 
close others (e.g., a good friend or significant other) into their conception of the self. As 
Situated Focus Theory (Guinote, 2007a) would suggest, especially those high (rather than 
low) in power seem to adapt to this. Namely, if they have included another person into their 
self, power-holders show more forgiveness than the powerless (Karremans & Smith, 2010). 
We take this reasoning one step further, arguing that similar processes play a role at 
the level of joint membership to a (self-relevant) group. Specifically, such processes should 
even extend to others who are not personally known to the power-holder. When being 
strongly identified with a group, people include many other people, namely the other group 
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members, into their (social) self even without knowing who exactly these others are, or 
whether they like the others (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Ellemers & Haslam, 2011; 
Haslam & Ellemers, in press). Such a more symbolic and abstract inclusion of others into the 
social self may have implications for power-holders  responsibility, as we outline in the 
following.  
How social identification facilitates the perception of responsibility 
Power research has, so far, rarely considered how the group context affects power-
holders (but see, e.g., Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam et al., 2011; for its 
impact on the powerless), and specifically, their responsibility (for an exception see Scheepers 
et al., 2013). This is surprising, considering that power-holders may often have control over 
the situation of others with whom they do share a joint group membership be it in the case 
of leaders and members of an organization, politicians and their party members, or 
prototypical representatives of a larger social category. Here, the power-holder and the less 
powerful person(s) belong to one-and-the same social group which may affect responsibility 
among power-holders within that group.  
When perceiving a group membership as a central part of their self-concept, 
individuals  interest and welfare. The more value a person attaches 
to that group in other words, the higher his or her social identification the stronger the 
willingness and motivation to engage in favor of that group (Ashmore, Deaux, McLaughlin-
Volpe, 2004; Ellemers et al., 2004; van Knippenberg, 2000). This implies a shift of  
from a personal identity ( as an individual person that differs from others) to a social 
identity ( care about joint outcomes). This shift not only means that 
other members become more relevant to a person, but rather that personal 
interests move to the background, while the interests of the group and its members become 
the main focus (Brewer, 1979; Ellemers, 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987).  
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Applying this to the domain of power, social identification with a joint group to 
which the powerful and the powerless belong has been shown to increase the willingness of 
low-power people to support and comply with their power-holder (Haslam & 
Ellemers, 2011). In other words, highly identified low-power individuals are generally happy 
to follow their leader; in turn, they seem unlikely to perceive a lot of responsibility to take 
care of the group  themselves, but are rather willing to vest this responsibility to 
their power-holder.  
Complementing this research, we focus on the power-holder for whom the effects of 
identification should be different. For a power-holder, high social identification should 
enhance responsibility to take care of the group and its outcomes. As outlined above, power-
holders should better respond to what is accessible in a situation (compared to the powerless; 
Guinote, 2007) usually, when the personal self is salient, accessible personal goals. When 
they are highly identified with a group, however, this should imply a stronger focus on 
social goals that is, a concern about the group and its members who are part of the (social) 
self. Accordingly, highly identified power-holders should perceive more responsibility than 
highly identified low-power members.  
Taken together, power-holders should perceive more responsibility than those low in 
power when their identification with the group is high, not when their identification is low (in 
which case the effect of power should be lower or even reverse; main hypothesis). In short, 
social identification should moderate the impact of power on responsibility. Support for this 
would contribute to a rising interest in the interplay between the personal self (here, 
- or low-power) and the social self (as member of a collective; Jans, Postmes, 
van der Zee, 2011; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). Moreover, such findings would critically extend 
power research which often examined responsibility-related tendencies towards a single, 
relatively unspecified other person (see Sassenberg et al., 2014), rather than other people who 
may, in fact, belong to the same collective as the power-holder (for exceptions, see, e.g., 
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Maner & Mead, 2010; Scheepers et al., 2013). In doing so, we seek to show that, just as 
power-holders respond more to personal goals (Guinote, 2007), they should do the same for 
goals at the group-level. Bringing together these two domains would suggest that power-
higher concern about their agenda (the ) may not preclude responsibility to take 
care of collective outcomes provided that others are included in power-  (social) self. 
The present research 
Two studies, a study via MTurk and an experiment, tested our prediction on the 
interplay between power and social identification. In Study 1, real-life power-holders (i.e., 
leaders) reported their experienced power, social identification with their organization, and 
perceived responsibility. Study 2 experimentally induced identification and power in a 
controlled lab setting. Participants recalled an experience in which they were either happy 
(high identification) or angry (low identification) to be a member of a group they belonged to 
(Kessler & Hollbach, 2005); participants then anticipated working on a dyadic task with a 
partner (i.e., a member of the same group used to induce identification), received a high- or 
low power role (cf. Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007b), and indicated their responsibility 
towards their partner.  
We determined data collection start and end points as well as the ideal sample sizes for 
both studies prior to data collection (N = 100 for Study 1, N = 25 per cell for Study 2, as a 
standard procedure at the time); to ensure against potential drop-outs or cancellations, as 
many participants as possible were recruited for the scheduled data collection period. Beyond 
our main dependent measure responsibility, all studies assessed perceived opportunity to 
explore potential effects on this other facet of social power (Sassenberg et al., 2012; 
Scheepers et al., 2013).1  
Study 1: Social identification among power-holders in organizations 
                                                 
1 Both studies captured additional exploratory measures as indicated in the Supplemental Material.  
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This study tested our prediction under realistic conditions among power-holders in 
organizational contexts. We focused on experienced power at work among leaders, because 
leaders likely do possess some power, though of varying degree (e.g., across job types, 
organizational contexts, levels of leadership position; e.g., Guinote, 2008; DeWall, 
Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011; Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner, & Galinsky, 2005, Weick & 
Guinote, 2008; see also Maner & Mead, 2010). This also enabled us to examine identification 
with a collective to which people actually do belong, namely, their organization. We expected 
that the more power leaders experience, the more responsibility they perceive provided that 
they highly (rather than lowly) identify with their organization. Beyond responsibility, we 
assessed wards misusing power for own ends as exploratory indicator of a 
potential longer-term implication of responsibility at work. 
Method 
Design and participants. One hundred and nineteen leaders participated (53 female, 
66 male; Mage = 32.8, SD = 10.80; range: 20-69) from lower (55.5 %), middle (36.1 %) and 
upper management (8.4 %), with, on average, 12.47 (SD = 16.74) subordinates they 
supervised. The data of two additional participants were excluded because these participants 
did not fulfill the pre-defined study requirements of being a leader (i.e., occupying a 
leadership position and/or supervising at least one subordinate); results are almost identical 
when including these two cases. 
Procedure and measures. Participants occupying a leadership position were invited 
to fill in a 10-min online survey on  via MTurk. First, to make 
their power salient, participants indicated their job function, number of subordinates, and 
employee status. Though all participants occupied a leadership position, we expected their 
extent of power to vary across job types, organizational contexts, and hierarchical position; 
we assessed their experienced power at work with five items (
POWER AND SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION 11 
 not at all to 7  a great 
deal 82; See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011).  
Second, we measured social identification with the organization (six items; e.g., 
90, Mael & 
Ashforth, 1992). Third, participants indicated their attitudes towards misuse of power to own 
ends (e. seven items from Lee-
, their perceived responsibility regarding the decisions they 
generally make in their job sponsible 
Scholl, Sassenberg, Scheepers, Ellemers, & de Wit, 2016; Scheepers et 
al., 2013; ), and perceived opportunity 
Scholl et al., 2017; 67; all on scales from 1 strongly 
disagree to 7 strongly agree). 2 
Results 
Perceived responsibility. We predicted that the more power leaders experience, the 
more responsibility they perceive provided that they highly (rather than lowly) identify with 
their organization. In short, we expected an experienced power × identification interaction. 
Multiple regression analyses tested this. In the first step, we regressed perceived responsibility 
on experienced power .02, p = .849) and identification  = .38, p < .001; all predictors 
z-standardized), F(2,116) = 9.31, p < .001, adj. R2 = .12. In the second step, we entered the 
experienced power × identification interaction, which was significant 35, p < .001), 
F(3,115) = 13.03, p < .001, R2 = .12;  
Unpacking the interaction, simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) demonstrated 
that, as expected, experienced power predicted more p = 
                                                 
2 As exploratory predictor, leaders also indicated their identification with their department; we did not 
consider this further in our analyses, because leaders often belong to several (sub-) departments at the same 
time; hence, it was not entirely clear which department each participant referred to. Identification with the 
department and with the organization were positively correlated, r(119) = .39, p <.001. Results for this 
predictor were similar to results for identification with the organization. 
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.017) when leaders were highly identified (+ 1 SD); in contrast, experienced power predicted 
less perceived responsibility .41, p = .001) when being lowly identified (  1 SD), see 
Figure 1.3 
Auxiliary analyses for misuse of power. We assessed attitudes towards power 
misuse as indicator of potential longer-term implications of responsibility at work. 
Accordingly, we explored whether power and identification may conjointly predict attitudes 
towards power misuse, and whether this may be explained by perceived responsibility. An 
analogous regression analysis demonst p = .197) 
.16, p = .088) descriptively, though not significantly, predicted misuse 
of power, F(2, 116) = 1.88, p = .157, adj. R2 = .02. This was qualified by an experienced 
.26, p = .006), F(3,115) = 3.94, p = .010, R2 = .06. 
Experienced power predicted more favorable attitudes to power p = .004) 
only when being lowly identified (  1 SD), not when being highly identified (+ 1 SD) 
.08, p = .516). Accordingly, (high) identification with the organization seemed to buffer the 
relation between experienced power and favorable attitudes towards power misuse.  
 Auxiliary analyses for moderated mediation. Combined with our main results, this 
suggests that when identifying highly (but not lowly) 
experienced power is perceived more as responsibility which may, in turn, predict less 
favorable attitudes towards power misuse. Following up on this, we explored a moderated 
mediation model with bootstrapping (Hayes, 2013; Model 7). Experienced power served as 
predictor, identification as moderator, responsibility as mediator, and power misuse as 
outcome. Similar to regression results, experienced power × social identification predicted the 
mediator perceived responsibility (interaction: B = .17, SE = .04, p < .001; identification: B = 
.29, SE = .05, p < .001; power: B = .05, SE = .06, p = .380); moreover, the mediator 
                                                 
3 This interaction remained when controlling for perceived opportunity (as another facet of power; .32, 
p<.001). Moreover, in line with research that identification can be a source of control (Fritsche, Jonas, & 
Fankhänel, 2008; here, power) experienced power and identification were significantly, but not too highly 
correlated (i.e., collinearity does not become an issue), r(119)=.249, p=.006. 
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perceived responsibility predicted the outcome, that is, less misuse of power (B = .55, SE = 
.10, p < .001; power: B = .09, SE = .06, p = .152). Finally, the conditional indirect effects 
indicated that experienced power predicted less power misuse (via more perceived 
responsibility) only when identification was high (B = .09, SE = .04), 95%-CI [ .174; 
.031]; the reverse was true when identification was low (B = .15, SE = .06), 95%-CI [.047; 
.298]. In short, this supported (exploratory) moderated mediation. 
Auxiliary analyses for perceived opportunity. Similar regression analyses showed 
that experienced p = .001) positively predicted perceived opportunity, as did 
i 32, p < .001), F(2,116) = 16.68, p < .001, adj. R2 = .21. Further, an 
experienced power × identification interaction 23, p = .007), F(3,115) = 14.26, p < .001, 
R2 = .05, indicated that experienced power predicted more 
identification was high p < .001), rather than low p = .820).  
Discussion 
This study provided first evidence that (experienced) power promotes responsibility 
when the person does identify with the collective to which others belong. The more power 
leaders experienced at work, the more responsibility they perceived provided that they were 
highly identified with their organization; when they were lowly identified, this relation was 
even reversed. The results, thus, support our hypothesis for experienced power at work, 
promoting the external validity of findings and suggesting that social identification at the 
organizational level can uniquely contribute to power-  perceived responsibility.  
Our auxiliary analyses suggest that, beyond the perception of responsibility, social 
identification may alter critical attitudes towards misusing power at work. Leaders are usually 
the ones who seek to influence followers to attain group goals; accordingly, they often do 
s (unless they strive for personal gain, such as 
to maintain or extend their power; see Maner & Mead, 2011). In line with this, our findings 
suggest that only when being strongly identified with the organization did 
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predict more perceived responsibility and, thereby, less (favorable attitudes towards) power 
misuse, whereas the reverse was true when being weakly identified. These results are merely 
exploratory and correlational; yet, they point towards an important potential longer-term 
implication of power- .  
Finally, experienced power also seemed to imply more perceived opportunity 
(replicating earlier research; e.g., Sassenberg et al., 2012). We observed that this was even 
stronger for highly identified individuals. This is a finding we did not anticipate and, 
accordingly, examined if this would replicate in the next study.  
In sum, Study 1 indicated that how social power predicts perceived responsibility does 
depend on the level of social identification with the joint group to which the powerful and the 
powerless belong. Despite the clear advantages of examining power in realistic settings here, 
however, the data precludes any conclusions about causality. Moreover, because we recruited 
part
status or the impact of third variables, such as type of organization or profession). To resolve 
this, Study 2 manipulated power (to enable a direct comparison for people having low vs. 
high power) and induced (low vs. high) identification in a lab experiment. To resolve this, 
Study 2 manipulated power (to enable a direct comparison for people having low vs. high 
power) and induced (low vs. high) identification in a lab experiment. We, again, focused on 
perceived responsibility in this study; we did not assess power misuse here because such 
attitudes likely represent a less meaningful, less variable indicator in a short-term 
experimental set-up. 
Study 2: Social identification with a real group and assigned power roles 
To test the prediction under controlled conditions, this study experimentally induced 
identification with an in-group participants belonged to (i.e., own generation; 
Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Then, we implemented a well-established power role 
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manipulation (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007b) in a supposed dyadic task with a partner 
from their generation (i.e., the same in-group as used to induce identification).  
Method 
Design and participants. The study comprised a 2 (social identification: low vs. high) 
× 2 (social power: low vs. high) between-participants design. One hundred fifteen 
undergraduates (75 female, 40 male; Mage = 23.3, SD = 3.94; range: 18-34) participated as 
part of a larger study package in return for 8 . Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions. We excluded three additional participants because they did not fulfill the pre-
defined basic study requirements (i.e., age < 35 years, because the study was based on young 
people  as salient social category); note that analyses including these N = 3 
yield highly similar or even stronger results. 
Procedure. We invited participants to the lab ollaboration between 
They completed two allegedly unrelated parts on 
lives and (2) cooperation among young people on an art gallery task. In the first part, 
participants completed the identification manipulation via recall, following the procedure by 
Kessler and Hollbach (2005). 
 as an in-group they factually belonged to. For this purpose, participants 
recalled a specific situation within the last year involving others from their generation. 
Specifically, they recalled and described a situation in which they had been either happy (high 
identification) or angry (low identification) to belong to their generation. After writing up a 
short essay about this situation, they completed four identification 
-agree not at all to 7-completely agree 74). 
In the second part, we administered the power manipulation (Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Guinote, 2007). Participants learned they would work on an alleged team task  with a partner 
from their generation (i.e., a member of the previously activated in-group; for similar 
procedures, see Postmes & Spears, 2002; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2002; Sassenberg & Boos, 
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2003; Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002; Spears, Lee, & Lea, 1990). Following standard role 
assignment procedures, this served to induce power, but did not take place in the 
end. After completing an alleged leadership questionnaire, participants were, in fact, 
randomly assigned to be the manager (high-power) or assistant (low-power) of an art gallery. 
The joint task of the manager assistant dyad would be to organize an art exhibition together. 
The assist (alleged) task was to follow instructions and contribute ideas. The manager
task (supposedly) implied structuring the task and evaluating the assistant by determining how 
to distribute a bonus money of 3 In doing so, power implied (anticipated) 
asymmetric control over resources. Participants completed three power 
1 agree not at all to 7 completely agree).  
Before completing their together, participants indicated how they 
expected the collaboration to turn out. This served as our measure of perceived responsibility, 
similar to Study 1 the 
).4 Again, we assessed perceived opportunity as exploratory outcome 
( 75; scales 
ranging from 1  disagree completely to 7 agree completely). Participants then completed 
demographic measures. Afterwards, neither the announced team task nor the distribution of 
bonus money took place; participants were carefully debriefed, thanked, and compensated. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. For self-reported identification, high identification participants 
did not indicate that their generation was more important to them than the low identification 
participants (Mhigh = 5.57, SD = 1.10; Mlow = 5.47, SD = 1.11), t(113) = .484, p = .629. Hence, 
                                                 
4 Originally, 5 additional items were assessed to capture responsibility in both studies; in Study 1, adding 
these 5 items to the perceived responsibility scale reported in the paper produced highly similar results (see 
Supplemental Material). In Study 2, the reliability of a complete 10-item responsibility scale was so low 
that we could not include all items as planned into one internally consistent scale. We, thus, ran an 
exploratory factor analysis for each study and used the respective 5 items with the highest loadings on each 
respective factor to compute an internally consistent and content-wise meaningful measure of this concept; 
more information on all 10 items and the factor loadings is included in the Supplemental Material. 
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this test does not yet allow for conclusions if our manipulation worked as intended (even 
though it did in the studies by Kessler & Hollbach, 2005) potentially because our items 
were framed more generally, rather than situationally. Indeed, such explicit checks have been 
criticized for different reasons (e.g., Kidd, 1976; Kühnen, 2010), one of them being that 
participants are not always able to explicitly articulate the effect a manipulation has on them 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). To make sure our manipulation did work as intended, we content-
analyzed the essays participants composed for the identification manipulation as an indirect, 
potentially more sensitive check. This served to investigate how much their recalled situations 
did reflect high vs. low identification situations, respectively.  
To do so, we used the LIWC2007 (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software; 
Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2007). It calculates the degree to which participants use 
specific, pre-defined word categories in text. For the present study, we analyzed the degree to 
which participants used -related words (e.g., words like include ) in their 
essays as the word category most closely reflecting social identification. If the identification 
manipulation was successful, participants should have used more such -related 
words in the high than in the low identification condition. This was, indeed, the case, both for 
the absolute -related words (Mhigh = 8.83, SD = 2.87; Mlow = 6.64, SD 
= 2.55), t(111) = 4.27, p <.001, and the relative -related words (divided by 
total number of words in the essays; Mhigh = .17, SD = .16; Mlow = .08, SD = .05), t(66.265) = 
4.20, p < .001 (total number of words used: Mhigh = 74.77, SD = 36.02; Mlow = 105.26, SD = 
52.83, t(98.98) = 3.59, p = .001); dfs result  
Importantly, this check suggests that our identification manipulation likely did work as 
intended; note that power was manipulated only after identification. 
For the power manipulation check, results yielded a main effect of Power, F(1,111) = 
372.41, p p² = .77; high-power participants (M = 5.95, SD = .67) experienced more 
power than low-power participants (M = 2.93, SD = .98). There was no main effect of 
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Identification and no Power × Identification interaction (Fs < 1, ps > .357). This suggests that 
the power manipulation was successful. 
Perceived responsibility. We expected that high (compared to low) power 
participants would perceive more responsibility when identification was high (rather than 
low). A 2 (Power) × 2 (Identification) ANOVA yielded no main effect of Identification (F < 
1, p = .884), but a main effect of Power, F(1,111) = 44.94, p p² = .29 (Mlow-power = 
4.95, SD = .84; Mhigh-power = 5.88, SD = .67), qualified by the predicted Power × Identification 
interaction, F(1,111) = 7.76, p p² = .07. Supporting the main hypothesis, simple 
comparisons indicated that high-power participants (M = 6.08, SD = .56) perceived more 
responsibility than low-power participants (M = 4.77, SD = .75) when identification was high, 
F(1,111) = 45.40, p p² = .29. This was to a lesser extent the case when identification 
was low (Mlow-power = 5.14, SD = .90; Mhigh-power = 5.68, SD = .72), F(1,111) = 7.61, p = .007, 
p² = .06, see Figure 2.5 
Auxiliary analyses for perceived opportunity. Results showed a main effect of 
Power, F(1,111) = 38.51, p p² = .26 (Mlow-power = 4.04, SD = .94; Mhigh-power = 5.03, 
SD = .77), but no no main effect of Identification, F(1,111) = 2.26, p p² = .02, and no 
interaction (F<1, p = .466). Accordingly, power increased the opportunity people perceived
independent of their level of identification.  
Discussion 
This study replicated findings from Study 1 in an experimentally controlled setting. 
Power-holders felt more responsible than the powerless especially when they highly identified 
with the group (here, their generation of young people) more so than when being lowly 
identified with this group. In contrast to Study 1, power here also promoted perceived 
responsibility when identification was low; yet, as expected, this effect was less strong than 
when identification was high.  
                                                 
5 Again, controlling for perceived opportunity as the other facet of power did not meaningfully alter this 
interaction, F(1,110) = 7.23, p p² = .06. 
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Again, our exploratory results suggested that power predicts opportunities, in line with 
the idea that people often associate power with opportunity (e.g., Sassenberg et al., 2012); in 
contrast to Study 1, this was independent of identification. Similarly, interaction patterns for 
responsibility in Study 1 and 2 differed for low identifiers: among low identifiers in Study 1, 
experienced power predicted even less responsibility, whereas in Study 2, power only 
predicted responsibility less strongly for low (than for high) identifiers. Though this remains 
speculative, this differential pattern across studies might be due to the lower control over 
other factors in the setting of Study 1 (compared to the power-role induction in Study 2). In a 
(likely) more dynami
more on other factors beyond their experienced power (such as identification with their team); 
for instance, highly (rather than lowly) identified leaders may be more motivating (see 
Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011) or more engaged, potentially evoking more support from 
their followers and organization all of which may contribute to more perceived 
opportunities at work. In contrast, experimental power settings (Study 2) afford only 
momentar
with high (vs. low) power may be more obvious here, irrespective of other factors (e.g., social 
identification). Similarly, in dynamic work contexts, leaders lowly identifying with their team 
may, over time, learn to focus more on personal outcomes (e.g., getting a promotion) and 
lower their sensed responsibility for their team; this may be less likely to occur in a shorter, 
more clearly defined task setting in the lab. These ideas are certainly tentative, but could be 
tested more directly in future studies. 
General discussion 
Power-holders are often the ones who make decisions with potential large-scale 
implications, both for themselves and others within their collective. While power-holders are 
usually , personal desires and benefits; Lammers et al., 2015), , 
at times, power-holders may also show a greater concern for others. The present research 
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sought to shed light onto specific situational preconditions within the group context that may 
help power-holders to perceive responsibility to take care of broader (collective) outcomes. 
Building upon social identity theory, we proposed that those high in power feel more 
responsible than those low in power when identifying strongly (rather than weakly) with the 
collective in which they possess power. Two studies supported this.  
The results have implications for power as well as social identity research. In terms of 
research on the consequences of social power , previous 
studies demonstrated a positive impact of traits (e.g., communal orientation, Chen et al., 2001; 
empathic concern, Côté et al., 2011; moral identity, DeCelles et al., 2012; other-focus, 
Gordon & Chen, 2013), situational goals (Galinsky et al., 2014; Overbeck & Park, 2006), and 
the personal relevance of a specific close other to the power-holder (i.e., relational 
commitment, Karremans & Smith, 2010).  
Our research builds upon this idea and goes beyond prior findings, showing that a 
shared social identity can render many (potentially unknown) others here, the group and all 
its low power in-group members relevant to the power-holder by means of (high) social 
identification. Interestingly, our results suggest that the heightened concern about the personal 
self that high (vs. low) power usually activates (e.g., Lammers et al., 2015) may also be 
effective for the social self: when the power-holder highly identifies with this social self and, 
accordingly, integrates others into the self, this power-holder seems also more concerned with 
taking care of the  welfare in short, perceives more responsibility.  
Notably, we tested predictions in a real-life  and a controlled experimental setting 
using well-established measures and procedures. Yet, the present research has some clear 
limitations. First, both studies relied on relatively small samples. Second, we manipulated 
social identification in Study 2 rather indirectly via recalled emotions; this is a validated 
approach to influence current levels of social identification (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005), yet, 
our manipulation may thus have confounded emotion (e.g., anger towards the in-group) with 
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identification. Third, both studies relied on self-reported responsibility. To address the first 
and second aspect, future studies should seek to replicate our findings with larger samples and 
more direct identification manipulations (e.g., using minimal group paradigms and bogus 
feedback; Faddegon, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2008; Woltin & Sassenberg, 2015). 
To address the third aspect, findings of Study 1 do suggest that social identification 
may also prevent power-holders from being ready to misuse their power . 
We here only considered attitudes towards power misuse as a valid, but rather indirect 
indicator of potential longer-term implications of perceived responsibility. Future research 
should, thus, examine actual behavioral implications, such as letting power-holders distribute 
actual resources between themselves and their followers (e.g., a real bonus; Giessner, van 
Knippenberg, van Ginckel, & Sleebos, 2013) or investigate how much they consider each 
individual follower  (e.g., individuation while communicating with followers; 
. 
Moreover, one may wonder if high power, low power, or both are driving the effects. 
Situated Focus Theory (Guinote, 2007) suggests that high power (not low power) should do 
so because high-power people should more flexibly adapt to their current level of 
identification (just as they better adapt to personal goals when the personal self is salient; e.g., 
Lammers et al., 2015). Moreover, social identification does promote tendencies for the 
-centered people (e.g., individualists; not among generally 
group-oriented prosocials; de Cremer & van Vugt, 1999). Accordingly, (high vs. low) 
identification should facilitate responsibility especially among power-holders (rather than the 
powerless).6  
For the social identity approach, our findings add to an emerging body of research on 
the interplay between personal and social self (Jans et al., 2011; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). 
                                                 
6 Exploring this by meta-analytically combining results from both studies supported this: high (vs. low) 
identification led to more responsibility among those high in power (mean effect size r=.36, p=.009), but 
not those low in power (r= .03, p=.302). 
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Importantly, to the best of our knowledge, we investigated for the first time how power within 
groups and identification with these groups affect g
especially among power-holders. Social identification may be especially useful to promote 
responsibility among those high in power (rather than those low in power; see Footnote 6); 
accordingly, in some situations, social identification may differenti
reactions depending on their level of power within the group, but also depending on other 
individual-level features (e.g., Jans et al., 2011).  
Finally, the present research has practical implications. In organizations, many 
established interventions aim at increasing identification with the team or organization for 
instance, to promote helping in times of need. By connecting social identification to (in-
group) power relations, our results suggest that such interventions may be especially useful to 
promote responsibility among those holding (some amount of) power. Interventions for 
followers, for instance, seek to increase identification and goal setting by means of joint goal 
setting between leaders and followers (Ellemers et al., 2004; Haslam, Platow, & Reicher, 
2010); similar approaches might be effective for those high in power, which remains to be 
tested in future research. As power-  responsibility-related tendencies predict positive 
outcomes for the team and organization (e.g., motivation and success; De Hoogh & Den 
Hartog, 2008), this may benefit team members as well as the collective (e.g., organization) as 
a whole. 
To conclude, the current research studied the interplay between power and the social 
self. Power- heightened focus on the (often personal) self can also have socially 
beneficial effects, namely, when power-holders identify strongly with a joint group to which 
they and the powerless belong that is, when the social self is relevant. In such cases, power-
holders (vs. the powerless) are particularly likely to recognize the responsibility their power 
affords. This makes them more inclined to take care of broader goals and may even tempt 
them less to misuse power .  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Perceived responsibility as a function of organizational identification (ID) and 
experienced power among leaders (Study 1, N = 119). 
 
Figure 2. Perceived responsibility as a function of induced social identification and 
manipulated social power (Study 2, N = 115). 
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Figure 2. Perceived responsibility as a function of induced social identification and 
































Table A. Factor loadings of all items to measure perception of responsibility on one factor in Study 
1 (leader sample). Items in bold are included in the study as main DV perceived responsibility. Items in 
italics served as additional exploratory items to capture potentially related, but more external aspects of 
responsibility (i.e., formal accountability as justifying actions to others). 
 
  Factor loading  
1. I sometimes think about how my decisions impact on others. .642 
2. I feel partly responsible for others' situation .580 
3. I am concerned about how much I can expect from others .488 
4.  
(to be reverse-coded) 
.518 
5. I am not concerned about others' well-being  
(to be reverse-coded) 
.537 
6. I must do what others expect from me .580 
7. I must ensure that everything goes well .708 
8. I am accountable .576 
9. I can build upon others .362 
10. I am guilty when things go wrong .606 
 
 
Please note that we assessed responsibility with 10 items when we started researching this 
construct  with the idea to directly measure felt responsibility (i.e., feeling the need to take care of 
things) and additionally (for exploratory purposes) an overlapping, yet potentially distinct perception 
wording to capture responsibility does slightly differ between Studies 1 and 2, because we were still in 
the process of building a reliable scale and because we assumed that slight adaptations to different 
participant groups (i.e., leaders vs. undergraduates) were likely needed.  
 
Items in italics in Table A were, thus, not originally intended to be included in the scale for 
perceived responsibility (but intended to explore accountability); in our leader sample, however, we 
found that these 5 additional items also loaded highly on the same factor as our 5 responsibility items. 
Accordingly, we also ran our main analyses in Study 1 using a composite 10-item-perceived 
responsibility scale . Results for 
this 10-item scale were highly similar as those reported for the 5-item-perceived responsibility scale 
as reported in the paper (see Table B below). We report results on the 5-item scale in the paper, 
because this scale was validated in other studies (e.g., Scholl et al., 2017) and comprised the items that 





Table B. Multiple regression results, regressing perceived responsibility on experienced 
power, social identification, and their interaction (main hypothesis; Study 1): 
 
5-item perceived 
responsibility scale (reported 
in the paper) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
experienced power  
(z-standardized) 
.02, p = .849 .08, p = .365 
social identification  
(z-standardized) 
p < .001 p < .001 
experienced power x 
social identification  
 p < .001 
 
F(2,116) = 9.31, p < .001 
adj. R2 = .12 
F(3,115) = 13.03, p < .001 
R2 = .12 
10-item composite 
responsibility scale  
(additional analysis) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
experienced power  
(z-standardized) 
p = .954 .04, p = .648 
social identification  
(z-standardized) 
p < .001 p < .001 
experienced power x 
social identification   
p = .003 
 
F(2,116) = 11.60, p < .001 
adj. R2 = .15 
F(3,115) = 11.44, p < .001 











Table C. Factor loadings of all items included to measure perceived responsibility on one factor in Study 2. 
Items depicted in bold are included in the main text as DV perceived responsibility. Items depicted in italics 
were originally intended to capture the main DV, but excluded from analyses because of poor factor loadings in 
this specific study. Underlined items are excluded because of the direction of the factor loading. For details see 
below.  
 
Responsibility item Factor loading  
1. I will sometimes think about how my decisions impact on others .460 
2. I can rely on others (to be reverse-coded) .532 
3. I will feel partly responsible for others' situation .748 
4. I will need to take care that everything goes the right way .770 
5. I will be concerned about how much I can expect from others .592 
6.  
(to be reverse-coded) 
.793 
7. I will not be -being  
(to be reverse-coded) 
.181 
8. I must do what others expect from me .148 
9. I will be accountable .317 




Following Study 1, we tested if all 10 items relating to responsibility constructs could be 
combined into a 10-item composite scale. However, using all 10 items with recoding those items 
which we originally intended to reverse-code, produced a non-
.35). Similarly, combining all felt responsibility-items (items 1-7) in one scale with recoding those 
items which we originally intended to reverse-code 
.13).  
For this reason, for Study 2, we ran a factor analysis, testing which felt responsibility items 
loaded highly on one factor. It revealed the factor loadings as indicated in Table C. Items in bold are 
included in our 5-item perceived responsibility scale and the analyses reported in the paper; items 
underlined and those in italics were not included. The factor analysis revealed factor loadings on one 
factor as indicated in Table C (also included in the Supplement).  
Importantly, we built this perceived responsibility scale we used based on two criteria related 
to scale reliability (not related to hypothesis testing): (1) factor loadings >.35, and (2) items for 
which the loading was consistent with the content (i.e., not including items with loadings in the 
unexpected direction; this was the case for the positive loading for item 6, where higher values 
content-wise actually indicate less responsibility; and for the negative loading for item 10, where 
higher values content-wise actually indicate more responsibility). 
 
As an additional check, we sought to test if our 5-item scale (i.e., the one we used in our main 
analyses) was differently and more strongly affected by the manipulations than the remaining 
(excluded) items that is, we compared the effects of power x identification across both scale 
versions. To do so, we tested if the predicted power x social identification interaction from Study 2 is 
qualified by the item set used (i.e., for a potential 3-way interaction of power, identification, and item 
set). If this interaction is significant, this would suggest that the effect for the five key items we used 
is, indeed, stronger than the one for the remaining (excluded) 5 items accordingly, this would 
provide additional evidence that both items sets were measuring different concepts in this study:  
We analyzed this by means of a 2 (power) x 2 (identification) x 2 (item set: our 5 item-scale, 
as reported in the paper, items in bold from above vs. remaining 5-items scale, comprising the unused 
items in italics/underlined) mixed analysis of variance with repeated measurement of the last factor. 
Results, indeed, yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1,111) = 6.41, p = .013, p² = .06; this 
three-way interaction is composed of two two-way interactions, namely, the power x identification 
interaction for perceived responsibility (our used 5-item-scale) as reported in the paper, F(1,111) = 
7.76, p = .006, p² = .07, and a non-significant power x identification interaction for the remaining 5 
items scale, F(1,111) = 0.29, p = .594, p² < .01, indeed, empirically validating the idea that the 
excluded 5 items likely measured another concept (but not perceived responsibility) in this Study 2. 
 
perceived responsibility towards others in this study, as these questions were originally intended to do. 
We, thus, based all analyses reported on a scale comprised of those items that allowed for the 




Additionally measured, but not analyzed concepts 
 
 helping motivation (Study 1) 
 objectification (Study 1) 
 preferences to distribute tasks (Study 2) 
